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NEGLIGENCE-DAMAGES-EXPERT

TESTIMONY

ON

PLAINTIFF

MOTORCYCLIST'S NONUSE OF A HELMET IS ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE ON
ISSUE OF DAMAGES

Kevin Halvorson, age eighteen, suffered a severe head injury
when the motorcycle he was operating collided with a truck driven
by Neil Voeller. 1 Prior to trial, Voeller indicated an intention to
introduce as evidence a physician's testimony2 to show that
Halvorson's head injuries would have been less severe had he been
wearing a helmet. Halvorson made a motion in limines to prevent
presentation of his nonuse of a helmet on either the issue of liability
5
or damages. 4 The district court granted Halvorson's motion.
Subsequently, a jury found Voeller ninety-two percent negligent
and Halvorson eight percent negligent in causing the accident 6 and
1. Halvorson v. Voeller, 336 N.W.2d 118 (N.D. 1983). The plaintiff brought this action as
guardian and conservator of his son. Id.
2. Id. at 119. The proffered testimony was that of a qualified neurosurgeon who had examined
'Kevin Halvorson about a year after his injury. The neurosurgeon was willing to testify that had
Halvorson worn a helmet, the potential for the type of brain injury he sustained would have been
lessened or eliminated. Deposition of Witness at 34-38, Halvorson v. Voeller, 336 N.W.2d 118
(N.D. 1983).
3. 336 N.W.2d at 119. A motion in limine is a written motion usually made before or after the
beginning of a jury trial for a protective order against prejudicial questions and statements. Beasley
v. Huffman Mfg. Co., 97 111. App. 3d 1,5,422 N.E.2d 241,244 (1981).
4. 336 N.W.2d at 119.
5. Id. In its answer to defendant's contention that it had abused its discretion in not allowing
testimony on Halvorson's failure to wear a helmet, the trial court reasoned:
In the absence of legislation imposing a statutory duty for helmet usage for motorcycle
riders over the age of eighteen, this court finds it would have been improper to
establish a common law duty of care .... Just as evidence of use or nonuse of seat belts
is inadmissible, the evidence of use or nonuse of motorcycle helmets is also
inadmissible.
Id.
6. Id. The accident occurred when the defendant, who had stopped at a stop sign, moved north
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awarded Halvorson $2,767,324.61 in damages. 7 Voeller appealed
for a new trial and contended that the trial court had abused its
discretion in not allowing testimony on Halvorson's failure to wear
a helmet.8 The North Dakota Supreme Court held that evidence of a
person's failure to wear a protective helmet while traveling on a
motorcycle is admissible to reduce the plaintiff's damages so long as
there is competent testimony by a qualified expert that the use of a
helmet would have lessened the injuries the plaintiff sustained. 9
In 196610 the New York Legislature enacted the first
mandatory helmet use law, 1 which prohibited any person from
12
riding a motorcycle without wearing state-approved headgear.
During that same year, the United States Congress passed the
Highway Safety Act, 13 which required each state to implement a
highway safety program under standards to be set by the Secretary
of Transportation (Secretary). In the event of noncompliance with
the Secretary's standards, the Act authorized the Transportation
Department to withhold certain federal highway funds from the
uncooperative states. 14 In June 1967 the Secretary promulgated a
highway safety program entitled "Motorcycle Safety" and
required the states to enact mandatory helmet use laws.1 5 During
the next nine years, all but three states substantially complied with
into an intersection. Id. Halvorson was traveling from the west on a motorcycle. Id. Halvorson had
no traffic control signal to yield to. Brief for Appellee at 7, Halvorson v. Voeller, 336 N.W.2d at 119.
Defendant was legally blind in his left eye. Id.
7. 336 N.W.2d at 119.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 121. The court in Halvorson explained that its holding places upon the defendant the
burden of proving (1) that a reasonably prudent person would have worn a helmet and (2) that the
plaintiff's failure to wear a helmet increased his injuries. Id. The latter must be shown by competent
eivdence of a qualified expert. Id. Only if the jury answers the first question affirmatively, that is, it
decides that the failure to wear a helmet is a breach of the duty to exercise ordinary care, may it go on
to review the expert testimony and apportion damages. Id.
10. For a discussion on the historical background of helmet laws, see Note, Helmetless
Motorcyclists - Easy Riders FacingHard Facts: The Rise of the "Motorcycle Helmet Defense, " 41 OHIO ST.
L.J. 233 (1980).
11. Act of Aug. 2, 1956, ch. 979, 1966 N.Y. Laws 3307 (codified as amended at N.Y. VEH. &
TRAF. LAW S 381 (McKinney 1970)).
12. See State v. Stouffer, 28 Ohio App. 229, 276 N.E.2d 651 (1971). In Stouffer the Court of
Appeals for Franklin County construed "protective helmet" as used in Ohio's helmet statute and
stated:
Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines "helmet" as "any of various
protective head coverings USU. made of a hard material (as metal, heavy leather,
fiber) to resist impact and supported by bands that prevent direct contact with the
head for comfort and ventilation." The soft cap appellant was wearing is not included
in that definition.
Id. at 231, 276 N.E.2d at 653-54 (construing OHIO REv. CODE ANN. S 4511.53 (Page 1973)).
13. Highway Safety Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-564, 80 Stat. 731 (1966) (codified as amended
at 23 U.S.C. 55 401-04).
14. Id. S 402(c). The Highway Safety Act directed the Secretary of Transportation to withhold
100% of a state's federal highway safety funds and 10% of its highway construction funds if that state
did not implement an approved highway safety program by early 1969. Id.
15. 23 C.F.R. 5 1204.4 (1979).
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the standard.1 6 North Dakota's mandatory helmet use law became
effectiveJuly 1, 1967.17
Constitutional challenges to mandatory helmet laws rapidly
followed the passage of these laws. 18 A majority of courts upheld the
laws as being within the purview of the states' police power.19 A
0
minority of decisions held otherwise. 2
The constitutional arguments2 1 generally have followed two
lines of reasoning, one attacking mandatory helmet laws as an ends
and one attacking helmet laws as a means. Under the ends
argument, challengers of the mandatory helmet use laws claim that
the laws are an improper exercise of a state's police power because
they do not bear a substantial relationship to the protection of the
16. See 1969 Ill. Laws Pub. Act No. 76-1586, § 11-1404 (codified as amended at ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 95 Y2, § 11-1404 (Smith-Hurd 1971)). The Illinois Supreme Court found the mandatory helmet
use law unconstitutional. People v. Fries, 42 Ill.2d 446, 250 N.E.2d 149 (1969). Utah's helmet law
requires helmet use only on roads with a posted speed limit of greater than 35 miles per hour. UTAH
CODE ANN. 5 41-6-107.8 (1970). California never enacted a mandatory helmet use law.
17. Act of Mar. '14, 1967, ch. 322, 5 1, 1967 N.D. Sess. Laws 650 (initially codified at N.D.
CENT. CODE § 39-21-48 (1967)) (repealed 1975). Session 39-21-48 provided:
Every operator of and passenger on a motorcycle. . . shall at all times when such
motorcycle is in motion be required to wear a crash helmet of a type and meeting the
standards approved and established by the motor vehicle registrar, provided,
however, such helmets shall not be required to be worn when such motorcycle is
driven in a parade or ceremonial conducted or permitted under local ordinances.
Id.
18. See Note, supra note 10 (challengers of helmet laws allege that the laws violate due process
guarantees and equal protection norms). See also Note, Motorcycle Helmets and the Constitutionalityof SelfProtective Legislation, 30 OHIo ST. L.J. 355 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Motorcycle Helmets,
(challengers allege helmet laws do not relate to public health and welfare).
19. See, e.g., City of Adrian v. Poucher, 398 Mich. 316, 247 N.W.2d 798 (1976) (in furthering
highway safety, the legislature may design a highway safety program to reduce the consequences of
accidents); People v. Schmidt, 54 Misc.2d 702, 283 N.Y.S.2d 290 (1967) (regulation of privilege of
driving motorcycle upon public highway is a legitimate use of state's police power); People v.
Bielmeyer, 54 Misc.2d 466, 282 N.Y.S.2d 979 (1967) (state has right to reasonably regulate how
riders of vehicles susceptible to special dangers should protect themselves on public property); State
v. Odegaard, 165 N.W.2d 677 (N.D. 1969) (a real and substantial relationship exists between the
exercise of police powers contained in the helmet statute and the public health, safety, and welfare);
Bisenius v. Karns, 42 Wis.2d 42, 165 N.W.2d 377 (purpose of helmet statute is to benefit public and
it may properly be used to minimize consequences of and number of accidents), appealdismissed, 395
U.S. 709 (1969).
20. See, e.g., People v. Fries, 42 Ill.2d 446, 250 N.E.2d 149 (1969) (legislature may not, under
guise of protecting public interest, interfere with private rights); Everhardt v. City of New Orleans,
208 So.2d 423 (La. Ct. App. 1968) (helmet statute deprives individual of liberty without promoting a
purpose beneficial to public at large); American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Davids, 11 Mich. App. 351,
158 N.W.2d 72 (1968) (helmet law has no relationship to public health, safety, and welfare and,
although it did have relationship to protection of individual motorcyclist, legislature cannot infringe
upon an individual's right to be left alone), rev'd sub nom., City of Adrian v. Poucher, 67 Mich. App.
133, -,
240 N.W.2d 298, 300, aff'd, 398 Mich. 316, 247 N.W.2d 798 (1976); People v.
Smallwood, 52 Misc.2d 1027, 277 N.Y.S.2d 429 (1967) (helmet statute unconstitutionally removes
from individual the right to exercise his judgment in use of personal adornment); State v. Betts, 21
Ohio Misc. 175, 252 N.E.2d 866 (Franklin County Mun. Ct. 1969) (helmet statute is significant
encroachment upon personal liberty and state failed to show compelling interest).
21. For a comprehensive discussion concerning the constitutionality of helmet laws, see
Motorcycle Helmets, supra note 18 (majority of states hold helmet laws are within purview of states'
police power). See also Annot., 32 A.L.R.3D 1270, 1273 (1970) (majority of states hold that helmet
laws are sufficiently related to public health, safety, and welfare, and'do not violate equal protection
norms).
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general public, but serve only to protect the individual motorcyclist
from himself.2 2 Consequently, the laws infringe upon the
motorcyclist's constitutionally protected right of privacy, right to
be left alone, and right to select one's own wearing apparel. 23
Under the means argument, opponents of helmet laws assert
that the laws are an unreasonable means of achieving the state's
purported ends. The laws allegedly violate equal protection norms
because they discriminate against a single class of motorcycle
25
operators2 4 and are ineffective in remedying perceived problems.
Prior to its repeal, North Dakota's mandatory helmet use
26
law had been challenged once. In State v. Odegaard27 the supreme
22. American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Davids, 11 Mich. App. 351, 158 N.W.2d 72 (1968). The
plaintiff brought an action to obtain a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of Michigan's
helmet law. Id. The Michigan Court of Appeals noted: "This statute has a relationship to the
protection of the individual motorcyclist from himself, but not to the public health, safety and
welfare. ... The precedential consequences of 'stretching our imagination' to find a relationship to
the public health, safety and welfare, require the invalidation of this statute." Id. at -,
158
N.W.2d at 76-77. See also People v. Carmichael, 53 Misc. 2d 584, 279 N.Y.S.2d 272 (1967). In
Carmichaelthe New York Court of Special Sessions, Genesee County, said: "[T]he police power does
not authorize statutes requiring a citizen to protect his own physical well being." Id. at -,
279
N.Y.S. 2dat 278.
23. People v. Smallwood, 52 Misc. 2d 1027, 1028, 277 N.Y.S.2d 429, 432 (1967) ("the statute
simply removes from the individual the right to exercise his judgment, or preference, in the use
of personal adornment, even though capricious"); State v. Betts, 21 Ohio Misc. 175, 177, 252
N.E.2d 866, 868 (Franklin County Mun. Ct. 1969) (" 'Liberty'... means 'the right of man to be
free in the enjoyment of the faculties with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to
such restraints as are necessary for the common welfare (emphasis in original)' ") (citation omitted).
24. Everhardt v. City of New Orleans, 208 So.2d 423 (La. Ct. App. 1968). In Everhardt the
Louisiana Court of Appeals upheld the equal protection argument and explained: "Further, we
conclude the ordinance also denies plaintiffs the equal protection of laws in that it imposes undue
restrictions on one class of the motoring public without any salutary effect to the public at large." Id.
at 426.
25. Note, supra note 10, at 236-37 n.25. Opponents of motorcycle helmet laws have attacked the
efficacy of helmets on primarily three grounds: (1) that helmets can themselves cause the neck and
spinal injuries found in injured, helmeted cyclists; (2) that helmets dangerously reduce the cyclist's
hearing; and (3) that helmets dangerously restrict a rider's peripheral vision. Id. These claims,
however, are severely weakened by numerous studies and reports advocating the effectiveness of
helmets in reducing head injuries. See, e.g., NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETYr ADMIN., UNITED STATES
DEP'T OF TRANSP., DOT-HS-805-312, A REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE EFFECT OF MOTORCYCLE
HELMET USE LAW REPEAL - A CASE FOR HELMET USE (April 1980) [hereinafter cited as REPORT];
NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., UNITED STATES DEP'T OF TRANSp., DOT-HS-801-759,
TECHNICAL NOTE ON THE EFFECT OF SAFETY HELMETS ON AUDITORY CAPABILrrY (September 1975);
NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN.,

UNITED STATES DEP'T OF TRANSP.,

DOT-HS-801-758,
(September

TECHNICAL REPORT ON THE FIELD OF VIEW WITH AND WITHOUT MOTORCYCLE HELMETS

1975).
26. For the text of North Dakota's original mandatory helmet use law, see supra note 17. This
law has since been amended. Act of Apr. 22, 1977, ch. 355, §§, 1977 N.D. Sess. Laws 786 (codified
as amendment at N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-10.2-06 (1977)). The current statute reads in pertinent
part:
No person under the age of eighteen years shall operate or ride upon a motorcycle
unless protective headgear, which complies with standards established by the
department, is being worn on the head of the operator and rider, except when
participating in a lawful parade. If the operator of a motorcycle is required to wear
protective headgear, any passenger must also wear protective headgear regardless of
the age of the passenger.
N.D.

CENT. CODE S 39-10.2-06 (1977).
27. 165 N.W.2d 677 (N.D. 1969). In Odegaard the defendant had been convicted of failure to
wear a statutorily-required helmet. State v. Odegaard, 165 N.W.2d 677, 678 (N.D. 1969). He
appealed, alleging that the statute was an unconstitutional use of the state's police power and that it
abridged his personal liberty. Id.
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court held that the state's police power is broad enough to include
the legitimate interest of protection of an individual from the
consequences of his own carelessness." The court in Odegaardadded
that even if the mandatory helmet use law deprived an individual of
certain personal freedoms and constitutionally protected rights of
the due process clause, it would not find the law unconstitutional
because a legislature may take reasonable measures to prevent
persons from becoming public charges, which is often the result of
the costs of the lengthy hospitalization period required by brain
29
injury cases.
The conflict grew between the federal government and three
30
states that had refused to enact mandatory helmet use legislation.
In 1975 the Transportation Department began sanction
proceedings against these states, which would have resulted in
withdrawal of substantial federal highway funding. 3 1 . However,
these proceedings were blocked when Congress passed the
Highway Safety Act of 1976.32 This Act withdrew from the
Secretary of Transportation the authority to require state helmet

laws. 33
Inevitably, this Act cleared the way for the repeal of helmet
laws by legislators who were influenced by their constituents'
ardent "freedom of choice" arguments. Within the first year of the
Act, nine states repealed their helmet laws. 3 4 During 1977 fourteen
28. Id. at 679. The court in*Odegaardcontinued that the requirement of protective headgear for
the exposed operator will enhance the motorcyclist's road performance by protecting him from loose
stones kicked up by passing vehicles or fallen objects such as windblown tree branches that could
cause the motorcyclist to lose control and become a menace to other vehicles on the highway. Id. But
c. State v. Betts, 21 Ohio Misc. 175, 175, 252 N.E.2d 866, 866 (Franklin County Mun. Ct. 1969).
The Betts court stated that not only does wearing a helmet not alleviate any real and substantial
public danger, but also that "[i]ncluded in a man's 'liberty' is the freedom to be as foolish, foolhardy
or reckless as he may wish, so long as others are not endangered thereby. The State of Ohio has no
legitimate concern with whether or not an individual cracks his skull while motorcycling. That is his
personal risk." Id. at -. , 252 N.E.2d at 872.
29. 165 N.W.2d at 677.
30. Note, supra note 10, at 238. The three states that refused to enact helmet legislation were
California, Illinois, and Utah. Id. at 238.
31. Id.
32. Highway Safety Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-280, 90 Stat. 451 (1976).
33. Id. S 280(a). Senator Alan Cranston offered the amendment to the Highway Safety Act of
1976 that withdrew from the Secretary of Transportation the authority to require state helmet laws
on behalf of his state of California, which was in danger of losing $50 million in federal highway
funding. 121 CONG. REC. 40, 261 (1975) (statement of Sen. Cranston).
34. The nine states are: Alaska (see 1976 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 230 (amending ALAsKA STAT. S
28.35.245 (1978)) (applies only to minors)); Arizona (see 1976 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 57, S 2 (amending
ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. S 28-964 (West 1976)) (applies to those under the age of 18)); Connecticut (see
1976 Conn. Pub. Acts 76-236, 51 (repealing CON. GEN. STAT. ANN. S 14-289c (West 1970 & Supp.
1977))); Iowa (see 1976 Iowa Acts ch. 1245, S 527 (repealing IOWA CODE ANN. S 321.446 (West Supp.
1979-80))); Kansas (see 1976 Kan. Sess. Laws ch. 51 S 1 (amending KAN. STAT. S 8-1598 (Supp.
1979)) (applies to those under the age of 16) amended by 1979 Kan. Sess. Laws ch. 41, S 1 (applies to
those under the age of 18)); Louisiana (see 1976 La. Acts No. 671, S I (amending LA. REv. STAT.
ANN. S 32:190 (West Supp. 1980))); Oklahoma (see 1976 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 81, S 1 (amending
OLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, S 40-105 (West Supp. 1979)) (applies to those under the age of 18)); Rhode
Island (see 1976 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 104, S1 (amending R.I. GEN. LAws S 31-10.1-4 (1969 & Supp.
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states, 35 including North Dakota, 6 joined the movement and
repealed their helmet laws. In 1978 four more states followed."
Only a few states have successfully staved off the helmet laws repeal
movement. 38

The helmet defense is of relatively recent origin, 39 appearing
in only four jurisdictions4 0 to date. The defense is predicated on a
general theory of mitigation in which evidence of the plaintiff's
failure to use a helmet is directed toward the issue of damages
rather than the issue of liability. 4 1 This is believed to be the most
1978))); South Dakota (see 1976 S.D. Sess. Laws ch. 194, 5 1 (amending S.D. CoMp. LAWS ANN. '
32-20-4 (1976)) (applies to those under the age of 18)).
35. The fourteen states are: Colorado (see1977 Colo. Sess. Laws 1899, §§ 1, 2 (repealing COLO.
REv. STAT. § 42-4-231 (2) (1973 & Supp. 1978))); Hawaii (see 1977 Hawaii Sess. Laws Act 183, § 1
(amending HAWAII REV. STAT. S 286-81 (1976)) (applies to those under the age of 18)); Indiana (see
1977 Ind. Acts Pub. L. No. 135, 51 (repealing IND. CODE ANN. § 9-8-9-3 (Burns 1973))); Maine (see
1977 Me. Acts ch. 22 (repealing ME. REv. STAT. tit. 29, § 1373 (1967))); Minnesota (see 1977 Minn.
Laws ch. 17, § 2 (amending MINN. STAT. ANN. § 169.974 (West Supp. 1980)) (applies to those unde
the age of 18)); Montana (see 1977 Mont. Laws ch. 54, 5 1 (amending MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 619-417 (1979)) (applies to those under the age of 18)); Nebraska (see 1977 Neb. Laws, Leg. Bill 314, 9
7 (repealing NEa. REV. STAT. 5 60-403.02 (1978))); New Hampshire (see 1977 N.H. Laws ch. 173:1
(amending N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. S 263:29-b (Supp. 1979)) (applies to those under the age of 18));
Oregon (see 1977 Or. Laws ch. 410, § 291 (amending OR. REV. STAT. § 487.730 (1967)) (applies to
those under the age of 18)); Texas (see1977 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 162, §1 (amending Tax. REv. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 6701c-3, § 2 (Vernon 1977)) (applies to those under the age of 18)); Utah (see 1977
Utah Laws ch. 267 § 1 (amending UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-107.8 (Supp. 1979)) (applies to those
under the age of 18)); Washington (see1977 Wash. Laws ch. 355, § 55 (repealing WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 46.37.530 (1970))); Wisconsin (see 1977 Wis. Laws ch. 204, 5 1 (amending WIs. STAT. ANN. S
347-485 (West 1971)) (applies to those under the age of 18)).
36. See 1977 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 355, S 3 (amending N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-10.2-06 (Supp.
1979) (applies to those under the age of 18)).
37. The four states are: Delaware (see 61 Del. Laws ch. 314 (1978) (amending DEL. CODE tit. 21,
54185 (1979)) (those over the age of 18 must have helmet in possession, those under the age of 18 are
required to wear it)); Idaho (see 1978 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 323, S I (amending IDAHO CODE § 49761A (1967)) (applies to those under the age of 18)); New Mexico (see 1978 N.M. Laws ch. 35, § 460
(amending N.M. STAT. ANN. § 64-18-55.1, recodified at N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-7-356 (1978))
(applies to those under the age of 18)); Ohio (see Ohio Laws 5-47 (amending OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 5
4511.53 (Page 1973 & Supp. 1978)) (applies to those under the age of 18)).
38. 13 HIGHWAY, HEALTH AND SAFETY, THE HIGHWAY Loss REDUCTION STATUS REPORT, Nos.
8, 11. The governors of the following three states have successfully vetoed helmet repeal efforts:
Maryland, 1978; Massachusetts, 1978; and Virginia, 1977. Id. In his veto message, Governor
Dukakis of Massachusetts said:
These chilling statistics [citing figures on motorcycle fatalities] clearly outweigh
any philosophical arguments that center around each person's presumed right to
decide for himself how much risk to life or limb he will take. Such arguments fade into
abstraction when measured against the very real tragedy that afflicts the family of each
person who dies unnecessarily.
Id. No. 11 at 11. In 1979 the Maryland legislature amended the state helmet statute to require
helmets only on minors. See 1979 Md. Laws ch. 746 (amending MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. 5 21-1306
(1977)).
39. See Rogers v. Frush, 257 Md. 233, 262 A.2d 549 (1970). Rogers is the first reported case
employing the so-called "helmet defense."
40. See id. (although failure to wear helmet may be relevant to issue of damages, helmet defense
is not available under doctrines of avoidable consequences or assumption of risk); Burgstahler v.
Fox, 290 Minn. 495, 186 N.W.2d 182 (1971) (evidence of nonuse of helmet not relevant because no
statutory duty to wear helmet existed at time of accident); Dean v. Holland, 76 Misc. 2d 517, 350
N.Y.S.2d 859 (1973) (omission to wear a helmet may be relevant and material on issue of injuries
and damages but is not relevant to issue of liability); Halvorson v. Voeller, 336 N.W.2d 118 (N.D.
1983) (helmet defense is irrelevant to issue of liability and should be limited to issue of damages).
41. See, e.g., Garrett v. Desa Indust., Inc., 705 F.2d 721 (4th Cir. 1983) (failure to use safety
goggles is admissible on issue of damages but not on issue of liability); Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk
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appropriate use of such evidence. Proponents of the mitigation

theory argue that since a defendant is liable only for those injuries
that he proximately caused,42 he should not be responsible for
injuries resulting from the plaintiff's failure to wear a helmet. 43
The mitigation theory of the helmet defense advances several

different approaches. Under one approach, the plaintiff's nonuse of
a helmet is an alleged violation of his duty to exercise ordinary care

44
for his own safety and, therefore, he is contributorily negligent.
Inherent in this approach is a need by the plaintiff to anticipate the

defendant's lack of due care toward him. 45 The theory, when
viewed in light of traditional tort doctrine that one is not under a
duty to anticipate the negligent acts of another, 4 6 is afforded little
viability. Additionally, the adoption of comparative negligence by
North Dakota 47 has abrogated the defense of contributory
48
negligence in this state.

A second approach to the introduction of helmet evidence
charges that failure to wear a helmet amounts to the motorcyclist's
assuming the risk of consequences of an accident. 49 Courts may
A.G., 647 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1981) (failure to use seat belt is admissible evidence concerning damages
but not liability); Benner v. Interstate Container Corp., 73 F.R.D. 502 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (nonuse of
seat belt may be considered in mitigation of damages but not on issue of liability); Franklin v.
Gibson, 138 Cal. App. 3d 340, 188 Cal. Rptr. 23 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (nonuse of seat belt relevant
only on issue of damages); Wagner v. Zboncak, 111 I1. App. 3d 258, 443 N.E.2d 1085 (1982)
(nonuse of seat belt relevant only to issue of damages and not to issue of negligence); Spier v. Barker,
35 N.Y.2d 444, 323 N.E.2d 164, 363 N.Y.S.2d 916 (1974) (nonuse of motorcycle helmet may be
considered on issue of damages only).
42. See Sevrinson v. Nerby, 105 N.W.2d 252 (N.D. 1960). In Sevrinson the North Dakota
Supreme Court identified the theory of proximate cause as a judicially imposed limitation placed
upon an actor's responsibility for the consequences of his conduct. Id. at 255.
43. Note, The Seat Belt Defense: A Comprehensive Guidefor the Trial Lawyer and Suggested Approachfor
the Courts, 56 NOTRE DAME LAw. 272, 275 (1980).

44. See Potts v. Armour & Co., 183 Md. 483, 39 A.2d 552 (1944). In Potts the Maryland
Supreme Court set forth a definition of contributory negligence: "It [contributory negligence] is the
doing of something that a person of ordinary prudence would not do, or the failure to do something
that a person of ordinary prudence would do, under the circumstances." Id. at 486, 39 A.2d at 556.
45. See generally W. PROSSER, THE LAw OF TORTS S 65, at 416-27 (4th ed. 1971). A measure of
contributory negligence is the need, in a given situation, to anticipate danger; but one may be
charged only with notice of what a reasonable and prudent person would have foreseen. Id.
46. See, e.g., Lafferty v. Allstate Ins. Co., 425 So.2d 1147 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (in absence
of a statutory duty, plaintiff is not under any duty to wear a seat belt); Amend v. Bell, 89 Wash.2d
124, 570 P.2d 138 (1977) (plaintiff did not have a duty to anticipate defendant's negligence and,
therefore, did not breach a duty by failing to wear seat belt).
47. See N.D. CENT. CODE 5 9-10-07 (1975). Section 9-10-07 reads in pertinent part:
Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any person or his
legal representative to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or injury to
person or property, if such negligence was not as great as the negligence...
attributable to the person recovering. The court may, and when requested by either
party shall, direct the jury to find separate special verdicts determining the amount of
damages and the percentage of negligence attributable to each party; and the court
shall then reduce the amount of such damages in proportion to the amount of
negligence attributable to the person recovering.
Id.
48. SeeWentz v. Deseth, 221 N.W.2d 101, 104 (N.D. 1974) (with adoption of the doctrine of
comparative negligence, the affirmative defense of contributory negligence is no longer available).
49. Rogers v. Frush, 257 Md. 233, 262 A.2d 549 (1970) (defendant claimed that plaintiffs
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dispose of this theory by refusing to find that a plaintiff voluntarily
exposed himself to a known danger or consented to the defendant's
negligent conduct thereby relieving the defendant of his duty to act
with due care.5 0 Again, the adoption of comparative negligence by
North Dakota has abrogated the defense of assumption of risk in
that state. 51
A third approach forming a basis for the helmet defense is the
doctrine of avoidable consequences, which is sometimes called the
doctrine of mitigation of damages. 52 The doctrine places a duty
upon an injured plaintiff to exercise reasonable diligence in
53
avoiding or minimizing the consequences of a defendant's wrong.
However, courts frequently have determined that an application of
this doctrine is inappropriate in cases in which the failure to
mitigate damages is allegedly due to an act that occurs before, and
not after, the plaintiff has sustained injury.5 4 Notwithstanding such
holdings, Dean Prosser states that so long as damages can be
accurately apportioned to their respective causes, it makes no
difference whether the plaintiff's negligence in aggravating his
injuries preceded or succeeded the defendant's negligence. 55
A fourth approach giving rise to the helmet defense is found in
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 465.56 Comment c 57 to
failure to wear helmet amounted to plaintiff's assuming the risk of the consequences of the accident).
The elements of the assumption of risk doctrine include an intentional and voluntary exposure to a
known danger and, therefore, consent by the plaintiff to relieve the defendant of obligation of
conduct toward him and to take his chances from harm from a particular risk. Id. at 554. See also
Wentz v. Deseth, 221 N.W.2d 101, 103 (N.D. 1974) (elements of assumption of risk are knowledge
of an abnormal danger, voluntary exposure to it, freedom of choice to avoid it, and injury
proximately caused by the abnormal danger).
50. Rogers v. Frush, 257 Md. 233, 262 A.2d 549 (1970). In Rogers the Maryland Court of
Appeals noted that the doctrine of assumption of risk rests upon an intentional and voluntary
exposure to a known danger. Id. at 238, 262 A.2d at 554.
51. 221 N.W.2d at 102, 104 (with the adoption of comparative negligence, the affirmative
defense of asumption of risk is no longer available).
52. PROSSER, supra note 45, § 65, at 422-24. The doctrine of avoidable consequences is a rule of
damages that denies a plaintiff recovery for any damages that can be avoided by reasonable conduct.
Id. The rule traditionally applies to a situation in which a legal wrong has occurred, but some
damages attributable to that wrong can still be avoided. Id. See supra note 41 for cases that have
applied this doctrine.
53. PROSSER, supra note 45, § 65, at 422-24.
54. See, e.g., Fischer v. Moore, 183 Colo. 392, 517 P.2d 458 (1973) (allowing the seat belt
defense would penalize the injured motorist and provide the tortfeasor with a fortuitous windfall);
Lafferty v. Allstate Ins. Co., 425 So.2d 1147 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (evidence of enhanced
injuries from failure to wear seat belt is mere hindsight and not admissible); Rogers v. Frush, 257
Md. 233, 262 A.2d 549 (1970) (doctrine of avoidable consequences not applicable since failure to
wear helmet was an event occurring before rather than after injury); Fields v. Volkswagen of
America, 552 P.2d 48 (Okla. 1976) (one's duty to mitigate damages cannot arise before he is
damaged); Amend v. Bell, 89 Wash.2d 124, 570 P.2d 138 (1977) (plaintiff is not required to predict
the negligence of defendant).
55. PROSSER, supra note 45, § 65, at 422-24.
56. RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF TORTS S 465 (1965). Section 465 states:

(1) The plaintiff's negligence is a legally contributing cause of his harm if, but
only if, it is a substantial factor in bringing about his harm and there is no rule
restricting his responsibility for it.
(2) The rules which determine the causal relationship between the plaintiff's
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this section, which deals with the causal relation between the harm
and plaintiff's negligence, states that damages may be apportioned
when the antecedent negligence of the plaintiff, even though it does
not contribute in any way to the original accident or injury, is a
substantial contributing factor in increasing the harm that ensues. 58
A fifth approach used to introduce helmet evidence to mitigate
damages is available in states that have adopted the doctrine of
comparative negligence. 59 North Dakota's comparative negligence
statute became effective July 1, 1973.60 Since comparative
negligence is geared toward apportioning damages between parties
according to fault, 61 the helmet evidence aids the jury in
62
determining the degree of fault of the respective parties.
negligent conduct and the harm resulting to him are the same as those determining the
causal relation between the defendant's negligent conduct and resulting harm to
others.
Id. at 510.
57. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 465 comment c (1965). Comment c states that damages
may be apportioned:
where the antecedent negligence of the plaintiff is found not to contribute in any way
to the original accident or injury, but to be a substantial contributing factor in
increasing the harm which ensues. There must of course be satisfactory evidence to
support such a finding, and the court may properly refuse to permit the
apportionment on the basis of mere speculation.
Id.
58. Id.
59. See Placek v. Sterling Heights, 405 Mich. 638, 653, 275 N.W.2d 511, 515 (1979) (judicially
adopting comparative negligence in Michigan). The following states have adopted comparative.
negligence for use in tort actions: Arkansas (see ARK. STAT. ANN. 1947 5§ 27-1763 to 27-1765 (1979));
Colorado (see COLO. REV. STAT. 5 13-21-111 (1974, amended in part, Supp. 1983)); Connecticut (see
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. S 52-572h (West Supp. 1984)); Hawaii (see HAWAII REV. STAT. S 663.31
(1976)); Idaho (see IDAHO CODE S§ 6-801 to 6-806 (1979)); Indiana (see IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-33-3

(Bums Supp. 1983, effective January 1, 1985)); Iowa (see IOWA CODE ANN. 5 619.17 note (West
Supp. 1983-84)); Kansas (see KAN. STAT. ANN. S§ 60-258a, 60-258b (1983)); Maine (see ME.-REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 14, S 156 (1980)); Massachusetts (see MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, $ 85 (West
Supp. 1983-84)); Minnesota (see MINN. STAT. ANN. S 604.01 (West Supp. 1984)); Mississippi (see
Miss. CODE ANN. S 11-7-15 (1972)); Montana (see MONT. CODE ANN. SS 27-1-702, 27-1-703 (1982));
Nebraska (see NEB. REV. STAT. S 25-1151 (1977)); Nevada (see NEV. REV. STAT. 5 41.141 (1979));

New Hampshire (see N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507.7-a (1983)); New Jersey (see NJ. REV. STAT. SS
2A:15-5.1 to 2A:15-5.3 (Supp. 1983-84)); New York (see N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 1411 (McKinney
1976)); North Dakota (see N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-07 (1975)); Oklahoma (see OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
23, § 13 (West. Supp. 1983-84)); Oregon (see OR. REV. STAT. S 18.470 (1983)); Pennsylvania (see PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. S7102 (Purdon 1982)); Rhode Island (see R.I. GEN. LAWS 59-20-4 (Supp. 1983));
South Dakota (see S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. 5 20-9-2 (1979)); Texas (see TEx. CIv. CODE ANN.
S 2212a. (Vernon Supp. 1984)); Utah (see UTAH CODE ANN. S 78-27-37 (1977)); Vermont (see VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, S 1036 (Supp. 1983)); Washington (see WASH. REV. CODE ANN. SS 4.22.005 to
4.22.920 (Supp. 1984-85)); Wisconsin (see Wis. STAT. ANN. 5 895.045 (Supp. 1983-84)); Wyoming
(see Wyo. STAT. 5 1-1-109 (1977)).
60. 1973 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 78 S 1 (codified at N.D. CENT. CODE S 9-10-07). See supra note 47
for the text of 5 9-10-07.
61. Prosser, Compartive Negligence, 51 MICH. L. REV. 465 (1953). The author stated that
"recoverable damages must be reduced in the proportion which the plaintiff's fault, or the extent of
his departure from the required standard of conduct, bears to the total fault of plaintiff and
defendant." Id. at 482.
62. See Amend v. Bell, 89 Wash. 2d 124, 570 P.2d 138 (1977). The Washington Supreme Court
in Amend explained that under the doctrine of comparative negligence, the trier of facts must hear the
totality of fault; it must look at all of the proximate causes of the collision and of its consequeni
injuries. Id. at 128, 570 P.2d at 142.
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The first reported case raising the helmet defense is the 1970
Maryland decision of Rogers v. Frush.63 In Rogers a father brought
suit on behalf of his minor son for injuries the helmetless son
sustained while riding a motorcycle and colliding with a negligent
motorist.6 4 On appeal from a judgment for the plaintiff, defendant
65
claimed the trial court erred in excluding medical testimony
offered to prove that: (1) the son's failure to wear a helmet
amounted to contributory negligence; (2) such conduct amounted
to his assuming the risk of the consequences of the accident; and (3)
because the son could have avoided certain consequences of the
accident, he should not recover for those injuries that could have
been prevented by his wearing a helmet. 66 The court rejected each
of these theories of the helmet defense 67 and affirmed the judgment
for the plaintiff.68
The next reported helmet defense case is the 1971 Minnesota
Supreme Court decision of Burgstahler v. Fox. 69 At trial, the defense
counsel attempted to cross-examine the plaintiff on his nonuse of a
helmet as a basis for contending that the nonuse caused the
plaintiff's partial loss of smell. 70 The trial judge disallowed the
question. 7 1 On appeal from a judgment for the plaintiff, the
defendant claimed error by asserting that the plaintiff was either
negligent or had assumed the risk of injury because he failed to
wear a safety helmet.7 2 Although Minnesota did not have a
63. 257 Md. 233, 262 A.2d 549 (1970).
64. Rogers v. Frush, 257 Md. 233, 233, 262 A.2d 549, 549 (1970).
65. Id. at 237-38, 262 A.2d at 551. The proffered testimony was that of a qualified neurosurgeon
with expertise in the field of investigating automobile accidents. Id. at 237, 262 A.2d at 551. The
surgeon was willing to testify that had the motorcycle driver worn a helmet, the chance of his
sustaining the injuries would have been reduced by 50 % and the chance of receiving a skull fracture
would have been reduced by 90%. Id. at 238, 262 A.2d at 551.
66. Id. at 239, 262 A.2d at 552.
67. Id. at 233, 262 A.2d at 549. On appeal, defendant argued contributory negligence, a theory
unavailable to him in the trial court because Maryland's mandatory helmet law was enacted
subsequent to the trial court judgment but prior to the hearing on appeal. Id. at 234, 262 A.2d at
551. In its response to this argument, the Rogers court relied on traditional tort doctrine that one is
not under a duty to anticipate the negligent acts of another and that it is not every action on the part
of a litigant that an opponent by way of "second guessing" or hindsight may successfully label as
contributory negligence. Id. at 235, 262 A.2d at 552. The Rogers court ruled that the avoidable
consequences theory was inapplicable because the doctrine comes into play only after the defendant
has committed the wrongful act. Id. at 236, 262 A.2d at 554. Regarding the assumption of risk
theory, the Rogers court refused to find that the plaintiff had voluntarily exposed himself to a known
danger or consented to the defendant's negligence so as to relieve him of the duty to act with due
care. Id. at 236, 262 A.2d at 554.
68. Id. at 233, 262 A.2d at 549.
69. 290 Minn. 495, 186 N.W.2d 182 (1971). The Fox case involved a collision between a
helmetless motorcyclist and a motorist. Burgstahler v. Fox, 290 Minn. 495, 186 N.W.2d 182 (1971).
The defendant motorist appealed from a judgment for the plaintiff, complaining that the lower court
erred in its refusal to allow defendant to cross-examine plaintiffon plaintiffs failure to wear a helmet.
Id.
70. Brieffor Appellant at 3-5, Burgstahler v. Fox, 290 Minn. 495, 186 N.W.2d 182 (1971).
71. Id. at3.
72. Id. The defendant in Fax asserted that the plaintiff had breached a statutory duty to wear a
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mandatory helmet law in effect at the time of the accident, the
defendant based the contributory negligence argument on a city
ordinance that required helmet usage by motorcycle operators of
rented machines.7 3 Citing Rogers as authority, the Fox court rejected
defendant's arguments and found the. ordinance inapplicable
because the plaintiff owned the motorcycle. 14
The third helmet defense case is Dean v. Holland,7 5 a 1973 New
York appellate court decision. Dean arose out of a collision between
a car and the minor operator of a minibike, a vehicle that New
York law classified as a motorcycle.7 6 New York had a mandatory
helmet use statute in effect. 77 In discovery proceedings, defense
counsel moved to depose plaintiff concerning his failure to wear a
helmet, but the plaintiff refused to submit to questioning. 78 On
defendant's motion to compel discovery, the appellate court held
79
that the plaintiff was required to answer the questions at issue.
In its 'opinion, the Dean court addressed two theories
underlying the helmet defense - contributory negligence and the
substantial factor test. On the theory of contributory negligence,
the court noted the mandatory helmet use law in effect and stated
that a party may be charged with negligence for the violation of the
statute provided a causal relation exists between the failure to wear
a helmet and the occurrence of the accident.8 0 The court did not
find that the violation of the statute caused or contributed to the
collision.8 1 The court continued, however, that the plaintiff's
nonuse of a helmet could have been a substantial factor in causing
his injuries and, therefore, a jury could find that the plaintiff could
not recover for injuries he sustained by not wearing a helmet. 82
helmet. Burgstahler v. Fox, 290 Minn. at 496, 186 N.W.2d at 183. The Fox court rejected this
argument because Minnesota's mandatory helmet use statute was not in effect at the time of the
accident and could not, therefore, provide a standard of conduct to which the plaintiff was required
to adhere. Id. at 496, 186 N.W.2d at 183.
73. 290 Minn. at 496, 186 N.W.2d at 183.
74. Id. As in Rogers, the Fox court refused to consider the applicability of the Minnesota state
helmet use law that had become effective before appeal but after the accident. Id.
75. 76 Misc. 2d 517, 350 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1973).
76. Dean v. Holland, 76 Misc. 2d 517, 517, 350 N.Y.S.2d 859, 859 (1973).
77. 1966 N.Y. Laws ch. 979 (codified as amended, at N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 381
(McKinney 1970) (operators of vehicles classified as motorcycles were required to wear helmets)).
78. 76 Misc. 2d at 518-19, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 861-62. The defendant in Dean also sought to
inquire of the minor plantiff if his parents had instructed him to wear a helmet. Id. at 519, 350
N.Y.S.2d at 862. The failure of the parents to instruct the child on helmet use would prevent them in
their derivative suit from recovering damages based on loss of services or medical expenses. Id. at
519, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 862.
79. Id. at 518-19, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 861-62. The Dean court reasoned that plaintiff's answers to
defendant's questions were necessary to determine if the minor plaintiff had acted in a reasonable
and prudent manner expected of a child of plaintiff's age. Id.
80. Id. at 519, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 861.
81. Id. The Dean court stated that it was unable to perceive how a violation of the statute caused
or contributed to the accident, or was a proximate cause of the collision. Id. at 519, 350 N.Y.S.2d at
861.
82. Id. at 518-19, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 861-62.
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The major issue in 1-lalvorson v. Voeller s was whether testimony
on the plaintiff's nonuse of a motorcycle helmet was relevant to the
issue of either liability or damages. 84 On the issue of liability, the
Halvorson court reasoned that the use or nonuse of a helmet
85 of an -accident. 6
ordinarily cannot be the proximate cause
However, the court continued that nonuse of a helmet may be a
contributing cause to the injuries sustained and, therefore, be
relevant to the issue of damages. 8 7 The Halvorson court discussed
two approaches that allow evidence of nonuse of a helmet on the
issue of damages: the Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 465,
comment c approach 88 and the doctrine of avoidable consequences;
89
which is sometimes called the doctrine of mitigation of damages.
The Halvorson court elected to follow these approaches" and
concluded that the nonuse of a helmet may be viewed as negligent
conduct that, if it is a substantial contributing factor to the harm
that a plaintiff incurs, may be considered to mitigate a damage
award even though the plaintiff's negligence was not a cause of the
original accident or injury. 91
83. 336 N.W.2d 118 (N.D. 1983). Halvorson arose from a collision between a helmefless
motorcyclist and a truck. Halvorson v. Voeller, 336 N.W.2d 118, 119 (N.D. 1983). The plaintiff
motorcyclist sustained severe head injuries. Id. Prior to trial, defendant sought to introduce evidence
that plaintiff's injuries would have been less severe had he been wearing a helmet. Id. The trial court
disallowed this evidence and defendant raised this issue on appeal. Id.
84. Id. at 119. The trial court had refused the admission of testimony on the plaintiff's nonuse of
a helmet and held that in the absence of a statutorily-created duty to wear a helmet, the court would
not impose a common law duty to do the same. Id.
85. See PROSSER, supra, note 45, at 237. A cause is a necessary antecedent of an event; it precedes
and brings about an effect or result. Id.
86. 336 N.W.2d at 119. The Halvorson court explained: "Ordinarily, evidence of nonuse of a
helmet has no relevance to the issue of liability for causing a'n accident; that is, seldom, if ever, will the
fact that a person did not wear a protective helmet contribute to the cause of an accident." Id.
(emphasis in original).
87. 336 N.W.2d at 118-19 See also Note, supra note 10, at 243, 269 (helmet defense is gaining in
stature).
88. 336 N.W.2d at 119-20. See supra notes 56-57 for the text of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 465 comment c.
89. 336 N.W.2d at 120-21. See supra notes 52-55 and accomplaying text for a discussion of the
doctrine of avoidable consequences.
90. 336 N.W.2d at 121. North Dakota is presently one of two jurisdictions which considers the
helmet defense for the awarding of damages. The other jurisdiction is New York. See Dean v.
Holland, 76 Misc.2d 517, 350 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1973) (omission to wear a helmet may be relevant and
material on the issue of injuries and damages).
91. 336 N.W.2d at 121. The Halvorson court's conclusion that nonuse of a helmet may, in
certain instances, be viewed as negligent conduct is valid in light of the increased vulnerability of a
motorcyclist as compared to the vulnerability of an occupant of a larger and an enclosed vehicle.
Statistics show that (1) in those states that have repealed their helmet use laws, the fatal head injury

rate increased as much as four times (REPoRT,supra note 25, at V-6); (2) during the first three years,
1976-79,

following the repeal of federal requirements,

the number of cycles involved in fatal

accidents rose over 26% (see

NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN.,

TRANSP., DOT-HS-804-030,

FACT BOOK: STATISTICAL INFORMATION ON HIGHWAY SAFETY at 111(4)2

UNITED STATES DEP'T OF

(June 1979); (3) the number of motorcycle fatalities per fatal accident is close to one, indicating that
the one fatality in these accidents is almost always a cycle occupant (NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY
ADMIN., UNITED STATES DEP'T OF TRANSP., DOT-HS- 804-832, FATAL ACCIDENT REPORTING
SYSTEM, 1978 Annual Report (1979)); (4) head injuries are the most frequent single cause of death for
both helmeted and unhelmeted cyclists, but the risk of a fatal head injury for unhelmeted cyclists is as
much as four times greater than for helmeted cyclists (REPORT, supranote 25, § V).
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The Halvorson court observed that the doctrine of mitigation of
damages is traditionally applied to the plaintiff's conduct following
his injury. 92 By applying the doctrine to a situation in which the

plaintiff's failure to minimize his injuries is allegedly due to his
nonuse of a safety device, the plaintiff is effectively required to
mitigate his injuries by his conduct that occurs before he is
injured. 93 However, if damages are capable of reasonable
apportionment to separate causes, the court noted that it should

make no difference whether the plaintiff's negligence in
aggravating his injuries preceded or succeeded the defendant's
negligence. 94 Additionally, the imposition upon the plaintiff of a
pre-accident obligation to anticipate a defendant's negligence may,

compared with the
in certain instances, be justifiable when
95
likelihood of and the severity of an injury.
To establish that the nonuse of a helmet is a substantial
contributing factor to the plaintiff's injuries, the Halvorson court
required competent testimony by a qualified expert. 96 Additionally,
the court provided jury instructions9 7 that first require a jury to
consider the plaintiff's nonuse of a helmet on the basis of a
reasonable person standard. 98 The court stated that if the jury finds
that a reasonable person would have worn a helmet and that
92. 336 N.W.2d at 120.
93. Id. The Halvorson court noted that a major criticism of considering a plaintiff's failure to use
a safety device in mitigation of damages is that the omission of the device is an act that occurred
before, and not after, the plaintiff sustained injury. Id. This allegedly deprives a plaintiff of the right
to assume the due care of others toward him. See, e.g., Amend v. Bell, 89 Wash.2d 124, 570 P.2d 138
(1977) (plaintiff did not have a duty to anticipate defendant's negligence and therefore, did not
breach a duty by failing to wear seat belt); Lafferty v. Allstate Ins. Co., 425 So.2d 1147 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1982) (in absence of a statutory duty, plaintiff is not under any duty to wear a seat belt).
94. 336 N.W.2d at 120 (citing W. PRoEssEa, THE LAw OF TORTS § 65, at 423-24 (4th ed. 1971).
95. 336 N.W.2d at 121. The Halvorson court drew heavily from the answer of a New York
appellate court given in response to the argument that a plaintiff has an undeniable right to assume
the due care of others toward him. Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y.2d 444, 452, 323 N.E.2d 164, 168, 363
N.Y.S.2d 916, 922 (1974). The Spir court reasoned that "[w]hen an automobile occupant may
readily protect himself [by using a seat belt], at least partially, from the consequences of a collision,
we think that the burden of buckling an available seat belt may ... be found by the jury to be less
than the likelihood of injury when multiplied by its accompanying severity." Id. at 452, 323 N.E.2d
at 168, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 922.
96. 336 N.W.2d at 121. The Restatement (Second) of Torts addresses the causal relationship
between the harm and the plaintiff's negligence and requires that evidence admitted under this
theory be satisfactory evidence to support such a finding, and the court may properly refuse to permit
the apportionment on the basis of mere speculation. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS S 465
comment c.
97. 336 N.W.2d at 121. Thejury instructions provided by the Halvorsoncourt state:
If you find (1) it was unreasonable-for the plaintiff to not wear a helmet, and (2) the
plaintiffwould not have received some or all of his injuries had he worn a helmet, then
(3) the amount of damages awarded the plaintiff for the injuries he sustained must be
reduced in proportion to the amount of injury he would have avoided by the use of a
helmet. The burden of proof on both (1) and (2) rests with the defendant.
Id.
98. Id. The Halvorson court stressed that it did not mean to say that whenever satisfactory
evidence is presented by the defendant to show that plaintiff's nonuse of a helmet contributed to his
injuries the jury must reduce damages; rather, a jury must first decide if a reasonable person
exercising ordinary care would have worn a helmet under the circumstances. Id.

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 60:751

competent evidence establishes a causal connection between the
plaintiff's failure to wear a helmet and the injuries received, then
the jury may reduce damages to the extent that a helmet would
have decreased the plaintiff's injuries.9 9 The reasonable person
standard is especially important since the Halvorson holding imposes
a judicially-created standard of care100 on motorcyclists in the
absence of a legislatively-created standard of care.101
Though afforded little attention within the opinion of the
Halvorson court, a final basis upon which the court's holding rests is
the doctrine of comparative negligence. 10 2 Since comparative
negligence apportions damages according to the fault of each party,
evidence such as that of helmet use or nonuse is relevant to the
determination of total fault of all of the parties.1 03 However, in
those jurisdictions that employ the "hybrid" rule of comparative
negligence, 10 4 which include North Dakota, 10 5 a court must decide
whether the jury may consider helmet evidence in apportioning
fault or whether it may consider such evidence solely to reduce
damages. 0 6 The Halvorson decision permitted the introduction of a
plaintiff motorcyclist's nonuse of a helmet as evidence to mitigate
his damages. 10 7 In a footnote the court also provided a method of
99. Id. The defendant has the burden of proving (1) that a reasonably prudent person would
have worn a safety helmet and (2) that the plaintiff's failure to wear a helmet increased his injuries.
Id.
100. Id. at 122. In its discussion of its judicially-created standard of care, the Halvorson court said
that merely because the legislature has decided not to require motorcyclists over eighteen years of age
to wear a helmet does not mean that these cyclists will never have a duty to wear helmets. Id.Further,
the court noted: "[a] court may adopt as a standard of care the requirements of'a legislative
enactment designed to protect a specified class of persons [but] it never has been suggested that a
standard of care may be inferred from a statute which does not require the use of safety devices by a
certain segment of society." Id.
101. North Dakota's current helmet usage legislation (codified at N.D. CENT. CODE S 39-10.206 (1977)) requires only motorcycle operators under eighteen years of age to wear a helmet. For the
text of S39-10.2-06, see supra note 26.
102. 336 N.W.2d at 121 n.2. For the text of North Dakota's comparative negligence statute, see
supra note 47.

103. Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MICH. L. REV. 465 (1953). The author stated that
recoverable damages must be reduced in the proportion that the plaintiff's fault bears to the total
fault of plaintiff and defendant. Id. at 482.
104. See Note, supra note 43, at 277. As used in this context, the "hybrid" rule is distinguished
from "pure" comparative negligence. Id. at 277 n.21. The hybrid rule permits the plaintiff to
recover some damages as long as his negligence does not exceed the defendant's. Id. Once the
plaintiff's negligence exceeds the defendant's, he is totally barred from recovery even though the
defendant may still be partially negligent in harming the plaintiff. Id.
105. See supra note 47 for the text of North Dakota's comparative negligence statute. The statute
allows for recovery by the plaintiff as long as his negligence is "not as great as" the negligence of the
defendant. N.D.. CENT. CODE S 9-10-07 (1975).
106. Note, supra note 43, at 277. If, under a hybrid comparative negligence doctrine, evidence
of use or nonuse of a safety device is applied to the issue of fault, a plaintiff will be barred from
recovery if his fault for the injury equals or exceeds the fault of the defendant for the accident; but if
such evidence is applied to the issue of damages, the jury will determine the defendant's liability for
the injury and then reduce those damages by the percentage of injury attributable to the plaintiff's
nonuse. Id.
107. 336 N.W.2d at 123. The Halvorson court concluded that helmet evidence is relevant to the
issue of damages and explained:
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calculating the mitigation of damages. 108
The Halvorson decision may result in increased helmet usage by
motorcyclists within North Dakota. It effectively charges
motorcyclists with a responsibility to provide for their safety by
using the reasonable and readily available means of helmets. 10 9 It
also opens the way for the seat belt defense,"I0 the predecessor of the
motorcycle helmet defense, to take a place in the line of defenses
available to a defendant to mitigate the plaintiff's damage award.
Thus, plaintiffs who fail to wear seat belts will have their damage
awards reduced by the percentage of their injury which is
attributable to the nonuse of seat belts.1I1
Evidence of a plaintiff's failure to use other safety devices,11 2
unless otherwise expressly provided for by statute, 113 will be relied
upon by defense counsel to place some of the liability for plaintiff's
injuries upon the plaintiff himself.
The court in Halvorson placed safeguards on a potentially
A reasoned application of well-recognized principles of tort law easily leads to the
conclusion that a jury should be permitted to consider whether or not plaintiff's failure
to wear a helmet may have been a substantial factor in bringing about his harm, and
whether or not in the exercise of ordinary care a person would have worn a helmet to
avoid or mitigate any injuries he might sustain in an accident.
Id.

108. Id. at 121-22 n.2. The Halvorson court provided the following example to explain how
mitigation of damages for contributing to the cause of an injury should operate under North
Dakota's comparative negligence statute:
Assume: X, driving a car, and Y, driving k motorcycle, get in an accident. Y is not
wearing a helmet. The jury finds X is 60 percent liable for causing the accident,
making Y, the motorcyclist, 40 percent liable for causing the accident. The jury also
finds Y would have avoided 60 percent of his injuries if he had worn a helmet;
therefore, X is 40 percent liable for causing Y's injuries. Y proves $100,000 in
damages.
On the basis of these findings, the $100,000 award should be reduced by 40
percent, which accounts for Y's contributing to the cause of the accident. Hence, the
award is diminished to $60,000.
The $60,000 should now be reduced to the extent that Y's injuries would have
been less had he worn a helmet, i.e., 60 percent. This adjustment leaves a total award
of $24,000.
Id. (emphasis in original).
109. See supra note 91 for statistical evidence in support of a judicial decision to charge
motorcyclists with a responsibility to take reasonable precautions for their safety.
110. See Note, supra note 10, at 241 n.53. The seat belt defense seeks to impose at least partial
responsibility for plaintiff's injuries on the plaintiff who, at the time of the accident, was not wearing
his seat belt. Id. The defense's origin has been traced to Stockinger v. Dunisch, No. - (Cir. Ct.
Sheboygan Co.. Wis. 1964). Id.
11. See supra note 41 for a partial listing of those jurisdictions allowing evidence of nonuse of a
seat belt to mitigate plaintiff's damages.
112. See, e.g., Garrett v. Desa Indust., Inc., 705 F.2d 721 (4th Cir. 1983) (stud driver operator's
failure to wear safety goggles may constitute contributory negligence and it is a question for thejury).
113. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE S 39-21-41.2 (Supp. 1983). Section 39-21-41.2 mandates use of
child restraint devices for children under two years of age riding in a passenger car; provides for a
fine not to exceed $20 for violation of this requirement; and provides that evidence of violation of this
statute is not, in itself, negligence, and such evidence will not be admissible in any proceeding other
than the one charging a violation of the statute. Id.
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broad holding' 14 by (1) requiring expert testimony on the
effectiveness of helmet use under given circumstances and (2)
instructing a jury that it must first find that a plaintiff acted
unreasonably and without due care by not wearing a helmet before
it may go on to calculate the effect of nonuse of a helmet on the
plaintiff's damages.11 5 Requiring expert testimony on the
defendant's behalf will inevitably lead to the need for expert
rebuttal on plaintiff's behalf. Use of experts by both sides will
undoubtedly lead to discrepancies of varying degrees between the
experts' testimonies. This is the reason numerous courts have
disallowed evidence of nonuse of safety devices, noting that such
discrepancies among experts' testimonies will cause the calculation
of damages to be conjectural and speculative. 1 6 However, many
courts hold otherwise, believing that the risk of speculative damage
awards is not so great as undermining the theory that a defendant is
liable only for those damages to which he contributed." 7 But for
those jurisdictions that have adopted comparative negligence, the
basic premise of the doctrine - to compare the total fault of a party
to the total fault of the other party - mandates that evidence of
118
nonuse of safety devices be admissible to mitigate damages.
Finally, the Halvorson court's requirement to review the evidence in
light of a reasonable person standard is intended to distill the,
experts' testimonies and render a damage award that reflects the
total fault of each party involved.

CYNTHIA WAGNER GOULET

114. See Fischer v. Moore, 183 Colo. 392, 517 P.2d 458 (1973). The Fischercourt did not permit
seat belt evidence because, in part, it feared abuse of such evidence. Id. at 395, 517 P.2d at 459. The
court said: "If we were to hold otherwise, the person who was driving a Volkswagen, and not a Mack
truck, could be said to be more vulnerable to injury and, therefore, guilty of contributing to his own
injury as a matter of law." Id.
115. 336 N.W.2d at 121. See supra note 97 for the text of the Halvorsonjury instructions.
116. See supra note 54 for jurisdictions that have disallowed evidence on nonuse of a safety
device to mitigate damages.
117. See supra note 41 for a list ofjurisdictions that have allowed evidence on nonuse of a safety
device to mitigate damages.
118. See supra notes 59-62 and 102-08 and accompanying text for an explanation of comparative
negligence and its impact on nonuse of safety devices to mitigate damages.

